Abstract: The material given in this paper delivers the procedure for numerical approach that allows finding the main practically important safety characteristics
Introduction
Most real technical systems are structurally very complex and they often have complicated operation processes. The common safety and operation including operating environment threats analysis of complex technical systems and critical infrastructures is of great value in the industrial practice. The convenient tools for analyzing this problem are the multistate system's safety modeling [7] commonly used with the semi-Markov modeling [6] , [10] of the systems operation processes including operating environment threats [2] , leading to the construction the joint general safety models of the complex technical systems and critical infrastructures related to their operation process and the operating environment threats influence on their safety structures and their components safety parameters [5] . The paper presents a general procedure for numerical approach applied to determine safety characteristics of the maritime ferry technical system and its components, related to its operation process including operating environment threats. The procedure is based on the model given in [9] . On the basis of the proposed procedure, the computer calculations in Mathematica environment determining these characteristics are performed.
Maritime ferry technical system operation process related to operating environment threats
The maritime ferry technical system is a series system composed of (Figure 1 ):  the navigational subsystem S 1 , composed of one general component , that is equipped with GPS, AIS, speed log, gyrocompass, magnetic compass, echo sounding system, paper and electronic charts, radar, ARPA, communication system and other subsystems;  the propulsion and controlling subsystem S 2 , composed of the subsystems:
 S 21 , which consist of 4 main engines , , , ;
 S 22 , which consist of 3 thrusters , , ;
 S 23 , which consist of twin pitch propellers , ;
 S 24 , which consist of twin directional rudders , ;
 the loading and unloading subsystem S 3 , composed of the subsystems:  S 31 , which consist of 2 remote upper trailer decks to main deck , ;
 S 32 , which consist of 1 remote fore car deck to main deck ;  the stability control subsystem S 4 is composed of the subsystems:  S 41 , which consist of an anti-heeling system , which is used in port during loading operations;
 S 42 , which consist of an anti-heeling system , which is used at sea to stabilizing ships rolling;  the anchoring and mooring subsystem S 5 is composed of the subsystems:
 S 51 , which consist of aft mooring winches ;  S 52 , which consist of fore mooring and anchor winches ;  S 53 , which consist of fore mooring winches .
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Fig. 1 The detailed scheme of the maritime ferry system structure
In this report, we assume that the maritime ferry technical system operation process and safety may depend on its operating environment threats and we distinguish the following 3 unnatural threats: ut 1 -a human error, ut 2 -a terrorist attack and ut 3 -a heavy sea traffic. Taking into account expert opinions on the operation process without of separation of the operating environment threats of the considered system, in Considering expert opinions (MSRSG, GMU, MOG) that at all operation states z b , b = , ,…,18, of the maritime ferry technical system, the probability of a human error, a terrorist attack and of a heavy sea traffic can be approximately and respectively evaluated as [2]
According to [2] , it was possible to predict the limit transient probabilities p' b , b = , ,…,72, of the maritime ferry technical system operation process Z'(t) including operating environment threats at particular states given in the list below (input data for Mathematica): 
Safety of maritime ferry technical system related to its operating process including operating environment threats
Maritime ferry technical system safety parameters
After discussion with experts, taking into account the safety of the operation of the ferry, we fix 5 (z = 5) safety states of the ferry technical system and we distinguish the following safety states:  a safety state 4 -the ferry operation is fully safe,  a safety state 3 -the ferry operation is less safe and more dangerous because of the possibility of environment pollution,  a safety state 2 -the ferry operation is less safe and more dangerous because of the possibility of environment pollution and causing small accidents,  a safety state 1 -the ferry operation is much less safe and much more dangerous because of the possibility of serious environment pollution and causing extensive accidents,  a safety state 0 -the ferry technical system is destroyed. Moreover, by the expert opinions, we assume that there are possible the transitions between the components' safety states only from better to worse ones. Considering the assumptions and agreements from Section 4, we assume that the components of the subsystem S  ,  = 1,2,3,4,5, at the system operation states z' b , b = 1,2,...,72, have the exponential safety functions, i.e. the coordinates of the vector (1) given in [9] are determined in Mathematica using the formula
where lambda is the ageing intensity of the maritime ferry technical system component at the system operation process state z' b , b = 1,2,...,72.
According to expert opinions, changing the maritime ferry operation process states including operating environment threats have influence on changing the system safety structures and its selected components' safety parameters as well. For this system, the intensities of components departure from the safety states subset {1,2,3,4}, {2,3,4}, {3,4}, {4}, without of operation impact (the input data for Mathematica), are given as follows:
 for the series-connected elements: lambda 1m = {0.020}; lambda 2m = {0.030}; lambda 3m = {0.040}; lambda 4m = {0.050};
 for the parallel-connected elements of subsystem S 22 :
lambda 1p = {0.015}; lambda 2p = {0.020}; lambda 3p = {0.025}; lambda 4p = {0.030}.
The coefficients related to the operation process impact in addition with the operating environment threats influence on the maritime ferry safety are given as a multiplication of the intensities (6)- (8) and the coefficients ro, mro and pro (of the series-, "2 out of 4"-and parallel-connected elements, respectively -see Figure 1 ) for the particular operation states: 1.3,1.1,1.1,1.2,1.2,1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1.1 1.3,1.1,1.1,1.2,1.2,1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1.1 1.3,1.1,1.1,1.2,1.2,1,1,1,1,1,1.35 1.1,1.15,1.15,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1} 1.1,1.15,1.15,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 1.1,1.15,1.15,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 If[b==41||b==61,{ro={1.1,1.4,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1} If[b==42||b==62,{ro={1.1,1.4,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 1.4,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 1.4,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 1,1,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1.05,1,1,1} * {1,1,1.2,1.2,1.4,1.4,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1} 1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1,1} 1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1 1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1,1} * {1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1}; mro={1.2} * {1.1}; pro={1.05} * {1.1};}];  If[b==24,{ro={1.1,1.05,1.2,1.2,1.1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1,1} * {1,1,1.2,1.2,1.4,1.4,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1}; mro={1.2} * {1.2}; pro={1.05};}];
 If[b==29||b==33,{ro={1,1,1,1,1,1,1.25,1.25,1,1.1,1,1,1,1} ; mro={1}; pro={1};}];  If[b==30||b==34,{ro={1,1,1,1,1,1,1.25,1.25,1,1.1,1,1,1 ,1} * {1.05,1.2,1.3,1.3,1.2,1.2,1.5,1.5,1.5,1.3,1.1,1.5,1.5,1.5}; mro={1} * {1.3}; pro={1} * {1.2};}];  If[b==31||b==35,{ro={1,1,1,1,1,1,1.25,1.25,1,1.1,1,1,1,1}  * {1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1,1.1} ; mro={1} * {1.1}; pro={1} * {1.1};}];  If[b==32||b==36,{ro={1,1,1,1,1,1,1.25,1.25,1,1.1,1,1,1,1} * {1,1,1.2,1.2,1.4,1.4,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1} ; mro={1} * {1.2}; pro={1};}].
The new intensities of components departure from the safety states subset {1,2,3,4}, {2,3,4}, {3,4}, {4} with the operation impact and also the operating environment threats impact on maritime ferry technical system safety are calculated using the formulae: newlambda_1 = lambda 1 * ro; newlambda_2 = lambda 2 * ro; newlambda_3 = lambda 3 * ro; newlambda_4 = lambda 4 * ro; newlambda_1m = lambda 1m * mro; newlambda_2m = lambda 2m * mro; (9) newlambda_3m = lambda 3m * mro; newlambda_4m = lambda 4m * mro; newlambda_1p = lambda 1p * pro; newlambda_2p = lambda 2p * pro; newlambda_3p = lambda 3p * pro; newlambda_4p = lambda 4p * pro.
Considering the agreements and assumptions from Section 4, the maritime ferry technical system is composed of subsystems S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 and S 5 , which components form a series-, "2 out of 4"-and a parallel-structure (Figure 1) . Thus, the following procedures determining the system safety functions coordinates considering (5) are constructed:  for the series system:
where Total gives the sum of the elements in one of the lists (6);  for the "m out of k" (m = 2, k = 4) homogeneous system:
where Binomial is the binomial coefficient
 for the parallel homogeneous system (n = 2):
where newlambda_u, newlambda_um, newlambda_up are the intensities of components departure from the safety states subset {u,u + 1,...,z}, u = 1,2,3,4, with the operation impact and also the climate-weather impact, given by (9) .
Maritime ferry technical system safety characteristics
In [7] , it is fixed that the maritime ferry technical system safety structure and its subsystems and components safety depend on its changing in time operation states. The influence of the system operation states changing on the changes of the system safety structure and its components safety functions is given in [2], [5] . Thus, in the case when the operation time is large enough, according to (1) given in [9] , the maritime ferry technical system unconditional safety function is given by the vector = [1, S'(t,1) , S'(t,2), S'(t,3), S'(t,4) ], t  <0,+∞ ,
S'(t,·
and considering the maritime ferry technical system operation process transient probabilities at the operation states given by (4), the vector coordinates are given respectively for t  <0,+∞ , u = 1,2,3,4, by 
, where [S'(t,u)]
, u = 1,2,3,4, b = 1,2,...,28, are given in [5] .
The graph of the three-state maritime ferry technical system safety function is presented in Figure 2 .
Fig. 2 The graph of the maritime ferry system safety function S'(t,· coordinates
The expected values and standard deviations (in years) of the system unconditional lifetimes in the safety state subsets {1,2,3,4}, {2,3,4}, {3,4}, {4}, calculated from the above results given by (11), respectively are:
and further, considering (12), the mean values (in years) of the unconditional lifetimes in the particular safety states 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively are:
Since the critical safety state is r = 2, then the system risk function is given by r'(t) = 1 -S'(t,2), for t  <0,+∞ ,
where S'(t,2) is given by (11). Hence, the moment when the system risk function exceeds a permitted level, for instance δ = 0.05, is  = r' 1 (δ)  0.17 year.
The graph (the fragility curve) of the maritime ferry technical system risk function r'(t) is presented in Figure 3 . 
Conclusions
The predicted safety characteristics of the maritime ferry technical system operating at the variable conditions including operating environment threats are different from those determined for the considered system without of considering the impacts of operating environment threats on their safety [3] . This fact justifies the sensibility of considering real systems at the variable operation conditions that is appearing out in a natural way from practice. This approach makes the systems safety prediction much more precise.
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